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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States makes clear its reverence for education by
demanding that its children attend school.' What is less clear, how-
ever, is the nation's dedication to each student's constitutional rights.
From the earliest days of the common law, public school students have
lacked fundamental rights, even the right of liberty in its narrowest
sense.' Although public students retain certain constitutional rights,'
the public school system maintains an elevated power over its stu-
dents." This power is like that of a parent,' including the duty to
"inculcate the habits and manners of civility" into its students.' The
public school's control over the student is "custodial" and "tutelary,"'
1. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1995, at 152 tbl.230 (115th ed. 1995) (noting that in 1990, over forty-one million
students were enrolled in America's public schools; by 2002, the number is estimated to reach
over forty-nine million).
2. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (noting that minors lack
the most fundamental rights of self-determination, including the basic right to come and go at
will).
3. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (noting
that students do not "shed their constitutional rights.., at the schoolhouse gate").
4. See generally Acton, 515 U.S. at 655-56 (recognizing a public school's inherent power to
control children within its halls, but not to such a degree that a constitutional duty to protect
arises).
5. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (stating "school
authorities ac[t] in loco parentis"). The school acts in loco parentis-in the place of a parent-when
parents delegate part of their parental authority to the school during the school hours. See
Acton, 515 U.S. at 655. William Blackstone described the in loco parentis power as when the
school "has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of
restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed."
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453.
6. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
7. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 655 (discussing a schoors enhanced power over the student).
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permitting a school to flex its authority over students within its halls,
even when the state could not control free adults.'
Schools possess a legitimate interest in maintaining a condu-
cive learning environment, arguably justifying this elevated control
over students.! In addition, the ever-increasing presence of drug use
within public schools poses a significant threat to the school's educa-
tional serenity."0 The Supreme Court has recognized that deterring
students from using drugs is not only important, but compelling," as
the deleterious and adverse consequences of drug use climax during
8. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (stating "a proper educational
environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules
against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult").
9. See id. at 340 (noting that courts must strike a balance between the student's legitimate
expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment
where learning can take place).
10. See, e.g., Acton, 515 U.S. at 648-49 (noting that in the Veruonia School District "teachers
and administrators observed a sharp increase in drug use," coupled with students boasting that
the school could do nothing about the students' involvement and use of drugs, a marked rise in
disciplinary problems, and reports of students becoming increasingly rude during class and
common outbursts of profane language). It is well documented that drug use in America's
schools is a pervasive problem. Researchers continually report statistics demonstrating that
student drug use is increasing. See Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158
F.3d 361, 375 n.12 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[t]he prevalence of drug use among our nation's
youth is beyond dispute"); see also Daniel Klaidman, The Politics of Drugs: Back to War,
Newsweek, Aug. 26, 1996, at 57 (reporting a recent federal study showing that drug use by
children ages twelve to seventeen had increased 80% since 1992). Courts have further recognized
the increase in student drug use. One court explained
[a]ccording to the DEA, in 1996, 18% of eighth graders used marijuana (up 6% in 1991),
and 34% of tenth graders used marijuana (up from 15% in 1992). In that same year, one
in four tenth-graders and twelfth-graders reported using drugs in the previous 30 days;
and fifteen percent of eighth-graders reported using drugs in the previous 30 days.
Knox County, 158 F.3d at 375 n.12. According to the FBI, there were over 60,000 juvenile arrests
for possession in 1994. See id. Further, because of drugs' pervasiveness within the school
system, schools are continually stepping up drug testing programs. See Nancy J. Flatt-Moore,
Comment & Note, Public Schools and Urinalysis: Assessing the Validity of Indiana Public
Schools' Student Drug Testing Policies After Vernonia, 1998 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 239, 240 n.7
(noting that one researcher found "at least 16 schools in 11 states were using some form of drug
testing on their students"); see also infra note 12, which describes drugs' deleterious effects on
students' bodies.
11. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 661. The Court noted that deterring drug use by school children
was equally important to enforcing laws that prevent drug importation, see National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (holding suspicionless drug testing of
employees applying for promotion to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring
them to carry firearms was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment), or the governmental
concern of deterring engineers and trainmen from using drugs, see Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989) (holding the Federal Railroad Administration's
adopted regulations requiring mandatory drug and alcohol testing without a requirement of a
warrant or a reasonable suspicion that any individual employee may be impaired was a
compelling government interest that outweighed the employee's privacy concerns, withstanding
a Fourth Amendment challenge).
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the school years. 2 Because of the increasing presence of drugs and the
consequences of drug use, America's public schools must continually
seek solutions to combat students' drug use.
Using Acton as the leading paradigm, coupled with the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals' persuasive reasoning in its Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, illustrated in Todd v. Rush County Schools, this
Note argues that a logical extension of precedent necessitates the
conclusion that public schools may constitutionally require students
who voluntarily enroll in extracurricular activities to undergo random,
suspicionless drug testing. Part II surveys the history of drug testing,
including its Fourth Amendment implications. Part III then analyzes
lower court decisions that have addressed the constitutionality of
testing public school students involved in extracurricular activities for
drugs. Finally, Part IV proposes a legal framework explaining why
courts should allow schools to subject their students to drug testing,
notwithstanding potential moral and ethical problems. As America's
school drug problem surges, courts must recognize the challenge of
maintaining a conducive learning environment-the basic educational
mission of schools-and balance this with students' fundamental
interest in privacy.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT
OF DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS
The lower federal courts have applied the Supreme Court's
drug testing jurisprudence to school's testing of student athletes. The
result has been a split in authority. The Court's response-Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton-has created a theoretical foundation for
12. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 661. The Court stated that "'[m ]a turing nervous systems are
more critically impaired by intoxicants than mature ones are'; 'childhood losses in learning are
lifelong and profound'; [sic] 'children grow chemically dependent more quickly than adults, and
their record of recovery is depressingly poor."' Id. (quoting Richard A. Hawley, The Bumpy Road
to Drug-Free Schools, 72 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 310, 314 (1990)); see also Todd W. Estroff et al.,
Adolescent Cocaine Abuse: Addictive Potential, Behavioral and Psychiatric Effects, 28 CLINICAL
PEDIATRICS 550, 555 (1989) (concluding that the data examined in the paper "suggest a direct
causal link between the progression and severity of cocaine abuse and the progression and
severity of addictive psychiatric, and psychobehavorial systems among the adolescents"); Kandel,
et al., The Consequences in Young Adulthood of Adolescent Drug Involvement, 43 ARCHIVES of
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 746, 753 (1986) (following 1004 young men and women from ages 15 and 16 to
age 25 and observing that prior use predicts future use and that "[u]se of a drug initiates a
cascade of events and consequences that is amplified by the regererative interaction of initial
drug use and its subsequent use"). Further, the Court noted that drug use affects not only the
students, but the entire educational process, disrupting the learning environment and the
faculty's ability to teach. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 662.
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extending the constitutionality of student drug testing beyond student
athletes to all students participating in extracurricular activities.
Using the Supreme Court's 1995 landmark Acton decision,13
which held that schools may conduct random, suspicionless drug
testing of high school athletes,"' school districts have sought to extend
testing to all students as a prerequisite for participating in extracur-
ricular activities.'5 Rationalizing that protecting students' health is a
primary concern, 6 schools justify imposing random, suspicionless
urinalysis testing on all students enrolling in extracurricular activities
ranging from athletics' to the library club. 8 These school districts
have barred students who do not consent to testing from participation
in specified activities. 9 Fourth Amendment issues arise, however,
concerning the school's imposition of mandatory testing programs
upon the individual student." Although the Supreme Court held that
random, suspicionless drug testing of public high school athletes with-
13. Since Acton's inception, a slew of commentators and lower courts cited, followed, and
criticized the decision and its language. Many criticize the opinion for substantially reducing a
student's basic individual rights. Acton caused shock waves to emanate throughout the legal
world. See, e.g., Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1105 n.18 (Colo. 1998)
(remarking that since Acton was decided, approximately 100 opinions have cited the case, and
commentators' views about Acton have saturated law reviews and other legal periodicals).
14. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65 (concluding that the Vernonia School District's policy was
reasonable and therefore constitutional).
15. See, e.g., Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 984 (7th Cir. 1998), reh'g denied en
banc, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 119 S. Ct. 68 (1998) (noting that Rush
County School Board adopted a program prohibiting any high school student from participating
in extracurricular activities or driving to and from school until the student and parent or
guardian consented to a random, unannounced, suspicionless urinalysis test for drugs, alcohol or
tobacco); Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1096-97 (noting that school district promulgated mandatory,
suspicionless urinalysis drug testing of all sixth through twelfth grade students seeking to
participate in extracurricular activities).
16. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (noting that "[the linchpin of this drug testing program is to
protect the health of the students involved").
17. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65 (sustaining random, suspicionless urinalysis testing of
high school student-athletes).
18. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 984-86 (sustaining random, unannounced urinalysis
examinations of students enrolling in extracurricular activities, including athletic teams,
Student Council, Foreign Language Clubs, Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Future Farmers of
America ('FFA") Officers, and the Library Club).
19. See, e.g., id. at 984 (noting that the school board's approved program prohibited any
high school student from participating in any extracurricular activities or driving to and from
school unless the student and parent or guardian consented to the drug, alcohol, and tobacco
testing).
20. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the federal
government shall not violate "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Further, the Fourteenth
Amendment extends the Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures of the individual's person to state actors. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213
(1960); see also infra note 32. Consequently, because of the state actor requirement, this Note
will only address drug testing in public schools.
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stands Fourth Amendment scrutiny,' the Court has not addressed
whether the Acton rationale may extend to public school students
voluntarily seeking to participate in any extracurricular activity.'
Lower courts are nevertheless beginning to tackle the issue.
This Note addresses whether a tested student who wishes to partici-
pate in extracurricular activities may sustain a Fourth Amendment
challenge against the school for violating his or her right to privacy
and right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.
A. Laying the Groundwork-Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence
Since 1985, the Supreme Court has recognized that public
school students maintain a diminished expectation of privacy within
the school system. 3 Abandoning the warrant and probable cause
requirements usually associated with Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, the Court traditionally applies a "special needs" rationale"'
to analyze whether searches in public schools meet the Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" test.' The Court has continually recog-
nized that mandatory, suspicionless drug testing is "reasonable" in
certain instances," with the Court setting forth landmark precedent in
its 1995 Acton decision."
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal appellate court to ex-
tend Acton and its progeny to uphold mandatory suspicionless testing
of students voluntarily participating in extracurricular activities.'
Using the Supreme Court's precedent established in Acton and its
progeny, this Note will demonstrate that Acton can and should be
logically extended to students voluntarily participating in all extra-
curricular activities.
21. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
22. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ('I comprehend the Court's opinion
as reserving the question whether the District, on no more than the showing made here,
constitutionally could impose routine drug testing not only on those seeking to engage with
others in team sports, but on all students required to attend school.'!) (emphasis added).
23. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (holding that school officials may
search students without strictly adhering to the probable cause standard); see also infra note 43.
24. The Court has applied a "special needs" analysis since 1987. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (providing that where circumstances make the Fourth Amendments
probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable, certain "special needs" may justify a
search).
25. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 653; see also discussion infra Part H.B.
26. See id. at 653-54 (reviewing different contexts where the Court upheld such searches).
27. See id. at 665 (holding that random, suspicionless drug testing on high school athletes is
' reasonable" and therefore constitutional).
28. See discussion infra Part III.A.
392 [Vol. 53:387
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1. New Jersey v. T.L.O.-Acknowledging that Suspicionless
Searches of Students May be Reasonable
The Supreme Court's 1985 decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
marks the Court's first major step to legitimize school searches of
students.' Reviewing whether the Fourth Amendment permits school
officials to search students' belongings' based upon reasonable suspi-
cion, the Court set forth the initial groundwork necessary to sustain
drug testing of students in extracurricular activities. Holding that the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and sei-
zures applies to public school officials,3' the Court reaffirmed the long-
standing notion that the federal Constitution's protection of individual
rights applies to public school students." The Court considers public
school officials as state agents for the purpose of Fourth Amendment
analysis, because officials assume a tutelary role over students and
29. The Court noted that although it originally granted certiorari to determine the
exclusionary rule's appropriateness concerning juvenile court proceedings dealing with unlawful
school searches, rather than actual law enforcement, the Court decided to expand its review to
the broader question of the potential scope of school authority in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332-33 n.2 (noting that the numerous lower federal and
state courts have attempted to resolve the tension between the school's need to maintain a
conducive learning environment and the rights of the individual student).
30. After discovering that a student and her friend were smoking cigarettes in the school's
bathroom, violating pre-established school policy, the teacher had the students meet with the
Assistant Vice Principal, who questioned them about their misconduct. See id. at 328. When the
student denied the violation, the official demanded to search her purse, finding cigarettes and
cigarette rolling papers often used for smoking marijuana. See id. A more thorough search
produced marijuana, a smoking pipe, associated plastic bags, a substantial amount of money, a
list of students owing money, and two letters indicating marijuana dealership. See id.
Subsequently, the State of New Jersey filed delinquency charges in Juvenile Court against the
student, and the court found the search reasonable. See id. at 328-29. The Appellate Division of
the New Jersey Superior Court agreed that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the
officials searched the studenes purse, but the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and ordered
the evidence to be suppressed, concluding the search unreasonable. See id. at 329-31. The
United States Supreme Court granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. See id. at
331 (citing 464 U.S. 991 (1983)).
31. See id. at 334.
32. See id. The Court stated that "tilt is now beyond dispute that 'the Federal Constitution,
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state
officers."' Id. (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960)); accord Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Court found equally indisputable that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits public school officials from encroaching on those rights of
the individual student. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334 (refusing to except boards of education from
Fourth Amendment scrutiny); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 637 (1943) (admonishing school boards and officials that educating the young for citizenship
entails "scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes').
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execute publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies as
representatives of the state."
The T.L.O. Court logically extended the Fourth Amendment's
command of reasonableness as the threshold test to the school
context. ' The balancing test necessary to determine reasonableness
weighs the individual student's legitimate expectations of privacy and
personal security against the public school's need to maintain a con-
ducive learning environment free from disorderly conduct, misbe-
havior, and interruptions by fellow students. 5 Although the student
maintains a certain legitimate level of privacy, 6 the school must still
closely supervise its students and enforce rules necessary to maintain
an adequate learning environment, a requirement of something less
than Fourth Amendment absolutism for schools and their officials."
Consequently, the T.L.O. Court excused school searches from the
usual warrant requirement necessitated by the Fourth Amendment.'
33. See supra note 32. Consequently, although often acting as surrogate parents, public
school officials cannot assert parents' immunity to escape Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37.
34. Id. at 337 (noting that reasonableness is determined by circumstances surrounding the
search that takes place).
35. See id. The Court extended Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)
(allowing administrative building inspections), to the school context, developing the necessary
balancing test between the determined specific class to be searched with the government's
purported compelling reason. See id. at 337.
36. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338 (noting that to receive Fourth Amendment protection,
society must be prepared to recognize the individual's expectation of privacy as legitimate).
37. See id. at 339-40 (noting that the state's interest in education necessitates a less rigid
rule for searches in the school setting than normally applies under Fourth Amendment analysis).
38. Id. at 340. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fourth Amendment, which
expressly requires either a reasonable warrantless search or a search pursuant to a warrant
based upon probable cause, see U.S. CONST. amend. IV., against public schools, see Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960). However, when the burden to obtain the warrant would
unduly frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search, the Court will dispense with the
warrant requirement. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 532-33. In T.L.O., the Court found that it would
"unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed
in the schools," to require the school teacher to first obtain a warrant before searching a student
suspected of violating school rules. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (expressly holding no warrant
needed by teacher to search student). In addition, the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of
probable cause before searching the individual. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Almeida-
Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66
(1968). Such a showing of "probable cause" is usually necessary to meet the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that all searches be "reasonable." See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. Yet,
the state actor may not always have to demonstrate "probable cause." Based on some type of
individualized suspicion that the person committed an infraction to justify a search of his or her
person, the Court has repeatedly "recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on
suspicions that, although 'reasonable,' do not rise to the level of probable cause." Id. at 340.41
(citing examples of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Because of "the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
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After excepting the warrant requirement, the Court further
abandoned the probable cause requirement.39 Joining the host of
courts that held a school's mission to maintain its learning environ-
ment outweighs the Constitution's requirement of probable cause
during searches,"0 T.L.O. suggested that individualized suspicion soon
will no longer be needed when searching students."1 The Court ex-
pressly stated that the legality of searching a student in a public
school depends only on reasonableness, taking into account all of the
surrounding circumstances. 2
In determining "reasonableness," the Court conducted a two-
fold inquiry: (1) whether school officials justified the search at its
inception, and (2) whether the search was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances that justified the interference. 3 In so doing, the
school official's own reason and common sense serve to regulate his
conduct, allowing the school to police its halls to ensure safety, with-
out unduly frustrating its efforts by requiring a warrant and probable
cause when a daily disciplinary problem arises." Yet, the reasonable-
ness standard ensures individual student privacy by mandating that
the school may intrude into the student's interests only as necessary
freedom to maintain order in the schools" the T.L.O. Court held that, in addition to not requiring
a warrant, the school teacher or administrator does not need to demonstrate "probable cause" to
search a student for potential rule infractions either. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. Instead, the
school official may search the student by only demonstrating the "reasonableness" of the search.
See id.
39. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; see also supra note 38.
40. See id. at 340-41 (reviewing precedent where probable cause was not needed and noting
that a "school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity
needed to justify a search); see also cases cited supra note 38. The Court noted that maintaining
discipline in school entails restraining students from "assaulting one another, abusing drugs and
alcohol, and committing other crimes, but also that students conform themselves to the
standards of conduct prescribed by school authorities." Id. at 342 n.9.
41. The Court later abandoned the need for individualized suspicion in the drug testing-
urinalysis context and allowed for random, suspicionless testing. See infra notes 56-59.
42. See T.L.O., 469U.S. at 341.
43. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). The Court then stated that a school
satisfies the inquiry's first part by having a reasonable belief that a search of the student will
produce evidence of a violation of the law or the school rules. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42.
The inquiry's second part will be satisfied as long as the search procedure is reasonably related
to the search's objectives, and is not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the suspected
offense coupled with the age and sex of the student searched. See id. at 342.
44. See id. at 341-43:
Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official
will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the
law or the rules of the school.
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to preserve the learning environment.45 In removing the traditional
requirements of individualized suspicion, probable cause, and a
warrant, and inserting in their place a balancing test and reasonable-
ness requirement, T.L.O. lays the groundwork that would justify a
logical extension of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to permissibly
allow the testing of students who voluntarily enroll in extracurricular
activities.
2. Skinner v. Railroad Labor Executives'Ass'n-Extending Fourth
Amendment Reasonableness to Drug Testing
Four years after T.L.O. provided a mechanism for extending
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the school setting, the Supreme
Court extended the reasonableness test to mandatory drug testing
within the employment context.46 When railway labor organizations
sought to enjoin the Federal Railroad Administration from requiring
workers to undergo mandatory drug and alcohol testing,7 the
Supreme Court held in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Asso-
ciation5 that even though breath, blood, and urine testing of the em-
45. See id. at 343. Justice Powell, joined by Justice O'Connor, provided further support in
stating that public school students' rights are not coextensive with adults who are outside the
schoors walls. See id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell specifically noted that
In any realistic sense, students within the school environment have a lesser expectation
of privacy than members of the population generally. They spend the school hours in
close association with each other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods.
The students in a particular class often know each other and their teachers quite well.
Id. Further, Powell stated: "It is simply unrealistic to think that students have the same
subjective expectation of privacy as the population generally." Id.
46. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to mandatory drug and alcohol testing by government
entities, and that such testing in the present case was reasonable).
47. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA") enacted mandatory blood and urine tests
of employees involved in certain train accidents, pursuant to its authority under the Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970, authorizing the promulgation of rules and regulations necessary to
maintain railroad safety. See id. at 606 (citing the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45
U.S.C. § 431(a) (repealed 1994)). Further, the FRA promulgated regulations authorizing
railroads to administer breath and urine testing to specified employees when they violated
certain safety rules. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606.
48. Concerned about alcohol and drug abuse among railroad employees and the railroad
industry's stagnant efforts to curb the problem, the FRA sought mandatory alcohol and drug
testing to ensure railroad safety. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-07. Finding that a significant
number of train accidents involved alcohol or drug use, the FRA imposed the blood and urine
testing program to detect the ongoing abuse. See id. at 607-12. The Railway Labor Executives'
Association, among other labor organizations, sought to enjoin the drug testing rules. See id. at
612. Although the District Court noted a valid interest in the integrity of the employees' bodies,
it held that the governmental interest in the safety of its employees and the general public
outweighed the employees' interests. See id. Yet, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
divided on the issue, reversing the District Courts holding in the end. See id. The Court first
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ployees is intrusive, the government's interest in safety outweighed
the employees' individual privacy interests.49
The Skinner Court reaffirmed the longstanding principle' that
an intrusion beneath an individual's skin, coupled with subsequent
chemical analysis of any samples obtained, is an invasion of the indi-
vidual's privacy, and thus a search implicating the Fourth Amend-
ment." The possibility that breath, blood, and urine testing may
reveal numerous extremely private medical facts, including epilepsy,
pregnancy, and diabetes, coupled with the possibility of the tested
subject being visually or aurally monitored while he or she produces
the sample, triggers the Fourth Amendment search analysis.52 How-
held that the breath, blood, and urine testing implicated the Fourth Amendment. See id.
Although circumstances surrounding the testing was exigent, the Ninth Circuit held that
individualized suspicion of particular employees was necessary before testing could satisfy the
reasonableness requirement. See id. at 612-13. The public interest in blanket, suspicionless
testing of employees was not sufficient to outweigh the employees' individual privacy interests.
See id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988), to examine the Fourth
Amendment question. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613.
49. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
50. Id. at 616 ("We have long recognized that a 'compelled intrusio[n] into the body for blood
to be analyzed for alcohol content' must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search."); see also
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (reviewing Schmerber and noting the "intrusion
perhaps implicated Schmerber's most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy');
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) ("Compulsory administration of a blood
test ... plainly involves the broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.').
51. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616; cf Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (noting
important Fourth Amendment difference between examining objects in plain view and exposing
concealed objects). The Court also concluded that breath tests are as intrusive as blood and
urine tests because breath-testing procedures, as described in the instant case, require in-depth
breath analysis known as "deep-lung" breath for the subsequent chemical analysis. See Skinner,
489 U.S. at 616-17. Consequently, the possibility of bodily integrity being compromised arises as
a significant issue that needs to be considered as a search in conjunction with blood and urine
testing. See id. at 617.
52. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. The Court based its conclusion partially on the persuasive
language derived from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit when it stated:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine.
Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all. It is a function
traditionally performed without public observation; indeed, its performance in public is
generally prohibited by law as well as social custom.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987); see also
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 646-47 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (remarking that the majority's
characterizing of the individual's privacy interests being implicated by urine collection as
'minimal,' "is nothing short of startling); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d
1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1988) ("There can be little doubt that a person engaging in the act of
urination possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy as to that act, and as to the urine which
is excreted.'); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1543 (6th Cir. 1988) ('There are
few other times where individuals insist as strongly and universally that they be let alone to act
in private.'); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 ().N.J. 1986) (explaining
"[urine] ... is normally discharged and disposed of under circumstances that merit protection
from arbitrary interference'); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968) (noting that
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ever, such testing may withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny if the
governmental actor establishes reasonableness. 3 Nevertheless, the
Skinner Court approved the T.L.O. rationale of excusing the warrant
and probable cause requirements,' finding that the government's
interest in ensuring railroad safety is much like its interest in school
safety, whereby "special needs" may justify departing from traditional
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.' The "special needs" rationale is a
categorical exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's traditional strict
requirements, a rationale that extends toconstructs other than T.L.O.
and Skinner.'
Abandoning the warrant58 and probable-cause' requirements
under the rationale that they only impede and frustrate government's
"in our culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute privacy, so much so
that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely distressing, as
detracting from one's dignity and self esteem"); cf. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113
(1984) (analyzing further the possibility of blood and urine sample obtainment constituting a
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment)
53. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985);
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768). Courts use the nature of the search and its surrounding
circumstances to analyze reasonableness. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S.
531, 537 (1985). The balancing test of weighing the intrusion on the individual with the
government actor's interests is the method courts use to determine reasonableness. See
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
555 (1976).
54. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)
(reviewing cases in which the Court permitted exceptions to the warrant and the probable cause
requirement).
55. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
56. Arguably, this rationale constitutes a "categorical exception" to the Fourth Amendment,
as it excuses the necessary warrant and probable-cause requirements, traditional mandates of
the Fourth Amendment. See generally id. at 619 (stating exceptions to this rule); Griffin, 483
U.S. at 873-74 (noting justifications for straying from the warrant and probable-cause
requirement).
57. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to
balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and
probable-cause requirements in the particular context."); see also infra Part II.A.3 (discussing
United States Customs service workers).
58. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-24. The court rationalized that the railway supervisors,
like the school officials in T.L.O., "are not in the business of investigating violations of criminal
laws or enforcing administrative codes, and otherwise have little occasion to become familiar
with the intricacies of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." Id. Consequently, the
warrant requirement would significantly hinder and frustrate the Government's objectives of
ensuring safety to the public and the activity's participants (e.g. school children in T.L.O. and
employees in Skinner). See id.
59. See id. at 624 (abandoning the traditional requirement of individualized suspicion and
noting that the requirement is "not a constitutional floor"). As long as the intrusion upon the
individual's privacy is minimal, the fact that the employee already subjects himself to certain
regulations and rules in the employment context justifies the abandoning of the probable cause
requirement, as he lacks a certain amount of freedom to come and go as he pleases. See id. at
624-25. Interfering with the railroad employee's freedom by subjecting him to a urine test does
2000] SCHOOL DRUG TESTING 399
safety objectives, the Skinner Court further rationalized abrogating
Fourth Amendment protection by stating that employees cannot
expect the same level of privacy when participating in pervasively
regulated industries.' The Skinner Court also noted that the govern-
ment needs to conduct drug tests to maintain a healthy and safe envi-
ronment for the railroad employees as well as the public they serve.6'
Consequently, Skinner stands as a constitutional justification for
allowing mandatory, suspicionless drug testing when public health
and safety concerns are paramount to privacy.6
3. National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab-Affirming
Reasonableness in Other Contexts
The same day the Supreme Court handed down the landmark
Skinner decision, the Court extended the "special needs" rationale to
allow the suspicionless drug testing of employees applying for promo-
tion to positions involving drug interdiction or the carrying of firearms
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.' Using Skinner's
not implicate serious intrusions upon the individual's privacy. See id. Consequently, by analogy,
as school children are subjected to the mandates and restrictions upon their freedom to move
during normal school hours, they lack the necessary privacy interests as well. See discussion
infra Part W.A. Furthermore, a logical extension of this rationale encompasses students who
voluntarily enroll in extracurricular activities, as the student subjects himself to the rules and
regulations of the particular activity and agrees to attend meetings and activities, thus
restricting his freedom to move and placing the extracurricular student within the same category
as outlined here. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
60. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.
61. Id. at 633 ('The Government may take all necessary and reasonable regulatory steps to
prevent or deter that hazardous conduct... [and] ... it may be necessary.., to examine the
body or its fluids to accomplish the regulatory purpose.").
62. Id. at 634.
63. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). In Von Raab,
the United States Customs Service implemented a drug testing program in May 1986. See id. at
659-60. The Service required testing for employees seeking employment in positions directly
involving drug interdiction or enforcement of related laws, activities requiring the employee to
carry a firearm, or activities requiring the handling of classified materials. See id. at 660-61.
Along with having to qualify for the position through the Customs testing program, each
prospective employee had to successfully pass a drug screening. See id. at 661. Any employee
testing positive without adequate explanation faced possible dismissal from the Service. See id.
at 663. Consequently, a union of federal employees and a union official sought to enjoin the
Service's drug testing program, on behalf of current Customs Service employees seeking those
positions. See id. The District Court acknowledged an important governmental need in ensuring
a drug-free work place and work force, yet concluded that the testing program violated the
Fourth Amendment, as being overly intrusive without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, determined that the
testing program was reasonable, noting that the search's intrusiveness was "minimal," and that
the Government had a substantial interest in ensuring drug-free employees because of the
nature of the jobs that the program covered. See id. at 663-64. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit
found that
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rationale,' the Court reaffirmed the abandonment of the warrant'
and probable-cause requirements,' finding that the government's
safety interests outweighed individual privacy interests. 7 Thus, the
Court logically extended the Skinner rationale to a new context by
allowing mandatory, suspicionless drug testing to ensure safe federal
law enforcement.68 By 1989, the Court had set forth two major pieces
of a new Fourth Amendment paradigm: (1) allowing random, suspi-
cionless searches within the school context, and (2) allowing random,
suspicionless drug testing of individuals within the employment con-
text, with the only limitation on testing being the evolving Fourth
Amendment reasonableness test.9
[i]llicit drug users... are susceptible to bribery and blackmail, may be tempted to divert
for their own use portions of any drug shipments they interdict, and may, if required to
carry firearms, 'endanger the safety of their fellow agents, as well as their own, when
their performance is impaired by drug use.'
Id. at 664. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 484 U.S. 903 (1988), and affirmed the Fifth
Circuit's judgment in part. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 664-66.
64. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (reiterating Skinner's rationale).
65. See id. at 667 (noting that "a warrant would provide little or nothing in the way of
additional protection of personal privacy').
66. See id. at 668 (stating that "the traditional probable-cause standard may be unhelpful in
analyzing the reasonableness of routine administrative functions).
67. See id. at 668, 670 (noting that "the Government has a compelling interest to ensure
that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and
judgmen'). The Court equated the importance of the Government's interest with the state's
interest in conducting random suspicionless searches on incoming travelers, a longstanding
legitimate function of the United States. See id.; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
154 (1925) (noting that the importance of national self-protection allows the country to require
travelers to identify themselves and their belongings).
68. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677, 679 (holding that suspicionless testing of Customs
Service employees applying for promotion to positions involving drug interdiction or the carrying
of firearms is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
69. It is important to note that in 1997, the Supreme Court struck down Georgia's
requirement that candidates for state office pass drug tests, holding that the suspicionless
testing program was not "reasonable," as the risk to public safety was not substantial and real.
See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (noting that "if a need of the 'set a good example'
genre were sufficient to overwhelm a Fourth Amendment objection, then the care this Court took
to explain why the needs in Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia ranked as 'special' wasted many
words in entirely unnecessary, perhaps even misleading, elaborations"). However, for purposes
of this analysis, the testing struck down in Chandler is inapplicable because it was completely
outside the school context, even though the Court relied on Acton for much of its analysis.
Instead, Chandler involved candidates running for public office, where a Georgia statute
required drug testing before the candidate may run. See id. at 309. Chandler is therefore
factually dissimilar, as public candidates are adults exercising a voluntary decision under a state
statute not within the confined school environment involving non-adults, the setting of this Note.
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4. Lower Court Jurisprudence-Applying the Court's
Paradigm to Different Contexts
As the Supreme Court struggled to define what "special needs!'
justify a departure from the Fourth Amendment's traditional warrant
and probable cause requirements, lower courts addressed the same
issue. Two major lower federal court decisions influenced the Court's
public school drug testing jurisprudence. Upholding one testing pro-
gram for athletes" and striking down another for all seventh through
twelfth grade students voluntarily enrolling in extracurricular
activities," these somewhat antithetical decisions would be the impe-
tus for resolutions of the constitutionality of random, suspicionless
urinalysis testing for public school students.'
70. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988).
71. See Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 760-61 (S.D.
Tex. 1989), affd 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
72. Other lower federal and state courts applied the Court's paradigm to even more
constructs than once imagined. See, e.g., Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ.,
158 F.3d 361, 374-75 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that school board's mandatory, suspicionless drug
and alcohol testing program was constitutional when administered to teachers and other officials
in "safety-sensitive" positions); DesRoches, 11 v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571, 578 (4th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the school principal's proposed search of a student's backpack was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment); Solid Waste Dep't Mechanics v. Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068,
1074 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the city failed to assert a "special need" for its suspicionless
drug testing of trash truck mechanics, and therefore the program failed the reasonableness test);
Aubrey v. School Bd. of Lafayette Parish, 148 F.3d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that school
board's interest in mandatory, suspicionless urinalysis of employed custodian outweighed
custodian's privacy interests due to elementary school employment context); Wilcher v.
Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 378 (3rd Cir. 1998) (holding Wilmington's drug testing policy
requiring firefighters to produce urine samples did not violate the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness test); Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 874-80 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding "special
needs" existed when state medical residency program required physician, whose status was a
"student-employee" with diminished expectations of privacy, to undergo private urinalysis drug
test subsequent to an alleged violation of hospital policy by slapping a disorderly patient); O'Neill
v. Louisiana, 61 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (E.D. La. 1998) (granting plaintiffs motion for preliminary
injunction enjoining the implementation of the State of Louisiana's mandatory drug testing of
elected officials pursuant to state statute); Gruenke v. Seip, No. CIV.97-5454, 1998 WL 734700,
at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1998) (declining to decide whether a school swim coach's forcing of
student to take pregnancy test violated student's Fourth Amendment rights); Brousseau v. Town
of Westerly, 11 F. Supp. 2d 177, 182-83 (D.R.I. 1998) (finding government's interest in safety of
students was compelling and urgent enough to justify warrantless pat-down search of sixth
grade student when large knife was noted missing from the school cafeteria); Ascolese v.
Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 358 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that public
transportation authority failed to demonstrate that special needs existed to excuse need for
warrant for mandatory pregnancy testing); Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 40 (W.D. Ark. 1985)
(holding that the school's policy requiring drug testing of any student who violated school drug
and alcohol code was improper and unconstitutional); Loder v. Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1234-35
(Cal. 1997) (holding city's suspicionless drug testing of all current employees who were offered
promotion was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, but that the city's suspicionless
drug testing of persons applying for and offered jobs was reasonable); California v. Latasha, 70
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a. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.-The Seventh
Circuit Sets the Stage
The Seventh Circuit set the stage for future Supreme Court
jurisprudence in the Fourth Amendment arena when it became the
first federal appellate court to uphold random, suspicionless urinalysis
testing of interscholastic athletes in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County
School Corporation." Based on nationwide drug abuse problems
among high school students and possible drug use by athletes at one of
its schools, Tippecanoe County School Corporation ('TSC") imple-
mented a random urine testing program for all interscholastic athletes
and cheerleaders in its school system." If a student tested positive,
the school informed the student's parents and allowed the student to
clear his or her name by offering an innocent explanation for the posi-
tive result.5 If, however, the student failed to explain the test result,
the school suspended the student from participating in the athletic
activity for part of the season. Two students sought declaratory and
injunctive relief from TSC's drug testing program, asserting that the
program was both offensive and intrusive.77
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals extended the Supreme
Court's T.L.O. rationale to the student drug testing context,7" con-
Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that random metal detector weapon searches
of high school students did not violate the Fourth Amendment); University of Colo. v. Derdeyn,
863 P.2d 929, 935 (Colo. 1993) (holding university's random, suspicionless drug testing of student
athletes was unconstitutional); Florida v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 319 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(finding that public school board's policy authorizing random, suspicionless weapons searches of
public high school students was reasonable and constitutional); Brennan v. Board of Trustees,
691 So. 2d 324, 329 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that student-athletes had diminished
expectation of privacy, that university's and NCAA's significant interests outweighed the
student's, and that urine testing was constitutional); Caruso v. Ward, 530 N.E.2d 850, 855 (N.Y.
1988) (upholding random urinalysis of police officers volunteering for organized crime unit);
Wisconsin v. Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Wis. 1997) (concluding that search of student's
coat and person within office of school liaison officer was reasonable).
73. Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988).
74. See id. at 1310-11.
75. See id. at 1311.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1311-12. In analyzing whether a search occurred, the court stated that the
excretory function of urinating was not only considered highly private, but the method of urine
disposal is also considered private because the individual does not knowingly avail it to the
public. See id. (comparing the discharge of urine to trash disposal, the subject of the Court's
holding in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), where no legitimate expectation of
privacy exists). Further, the removal and taking of scrapings under an individual's fingernails,
pubic hair, breath samples, X-rays, or the compelling of urination all constitute potential Fourth
Amendment searches. See id. at 1312 n.1 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (detention to compel bowel movement constitutes a Fourth Amendment
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cluding that probable cause and warrants were not required for a
random drug testing program.' The Seventh Circuit interpreted the
Supreme Court's holding in T.L.O. quite broadly, remarking that
school officials are not required to keep abreast of the ever-changing
Fourth Amendment search doctrine, nor are they required to retain
lawyers and use the court system when investigating a possible school
violation.' Invoking the reasonableness test,1 the Seventh Circuit
observed that student athletes possess diminished expectations of
privacy because of the "communal undress" inherent in athletic par-
ticipation, along with extensive athletic regulations.' These char-
acteristics distinguish athletics from other activities.'
In upholding the drug testing program, the court found par-
ticularly relevant the fact that students could have avoided the drug
testing program entirely by choosing not to partfcipate in athletics.'
In addition, the Seventh Circuit noted that students who participate
in athletics receive the benefit of enhanced prestige and status within
the school community for their efforts.' Finally, the fact that drug
usage exacerbates athletic injuries formed a health and safety ration-
search); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 (1973) (fingernail scrapings constitute a Fourth
Amendment search); Burnette v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986)
(breath analysis constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729
F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1984) (obtaining X-rays constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); Bouse v.
Bussey, 573 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (obtaining pubic hair sample constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search); Thornburg v. Dora, 677 F. Supp. 581, 586-87 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (breath
analysis constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Allen, 337 F. Supp. 1041,
1043 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (obtaining X-rays constitutes a Fourth Amendment search); State v. Locke,
418 A.2d 843, 846-47 (R.I. 1980) (breath analysis constitutes a Fourth Amendment search)).
79. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1314 ("Unfortunately for the appellants, we believe that the
Supreme Court has already struck the appropriate balance in the context of school searches, and
has determined that the probable cause and warrant requirements do not apply.").
80. See id. at 1314-15 (noting why the Supreme Court's holding in T.L.O. is stated quite
broadly).
81. See id. at 1315.
82. See id. at 1318-19. The court discussed the heightened level of regulation often
associated with joining athletics, observing that athletics require a minimum GPA, residency
requirements, eligibility requirements and that athletes subject themselves to additional
training rules prohibiting smoking, drinking, and drug use on and off school premises. See id.
83. See id. at 1318-19. The court further noted that the random testing of athletes does not
equate to testing non-athletes like those participating in the band and chess team. See id. at
1319. Further, the Seventh Circuit expressly distinguished its decision from blanket testing the
entire school population, refusing to endorse the testing of all students. See id. at 1319 n.10; cf.
Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg'l Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709, 713-14 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1985) (striking down drug testing program for all students enrolled in school).
84. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319 & n.11. The court remarked that a greater intrusion
would have occurred if all students were searched without any realistic option of opting out of
the testing program. See id. at 1319 n.11.
85. See id. at 1320. The court further stated that "[b]ecause of their high visibility and
leadership roles, it is not unreasonable to single out athletes and cheerleaders for special
attention with respect to drug usage." Id.
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ale to cap off the Seventh Circuit's reasoning why drug testing stu-
dents voluntarily enrolling in athletic and cheerleading activities is
reasonable.' Athlete drug testing thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because of students' reduced expectation of privacy and
the school's need to curb the drug problem among students.7
b. Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School
District-Rejection, Distinguishment, or Anomaly?
Another major federal court decision held unconstitutional
urinalysis drug testing of students participating in extracurricular
activities. After a small group of parents and students petitioned the
school board to attempt to eliminate the drug and alcohol abuse of its
students, the school board unanimously enacted a drug testing pro-
gram requiring mandatory, random urinalysis testing of students
participating in extracurricular activities.'
A senior who participated in the high school's Future Farmers
of America ('FFA") program sought injunctive relief to prevent the
school from precluding his participation in an upcoming FFA competi-
tion due to his refusal to undergo urinalysis." Extending the Court's
Von Raab and T.L.O. analytical construct to determine the constitu-
tionality of the school district's drug testing program, the court ob-
served that the program was an intrusive across-the-board search of a
86. See id. at 1320-21.
87. See id. The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Courts language in T.L.O.,
observing that T.L.O. described the drug problem among students as "'one of the particularly
ugly forms' in which school disciplinary problems commonly arise in present-day America." Id.
at 1320. Further, the court based its decision on the statistical evidence demonstrating that at
the current time, over half the seniors in Indiana had at least tried marijuana. See id. One third
used marijuana on a weekly basis, and in one of the school district's schools, members of the
baseball team tested positively for drug use. See id. The Schaill decision served as the pre-
cursor to Acton, setting the stage for the evolving constitutionality of drug testing within the
system by its language arguing that schools need enhanced control to maintain their learning
environments; and with drugs exacerbating injuries to student athletes, the Seventh Circuit's
decision to allow drug testing provided a justified rationale for the Court to look to when deciding
Acton. Cf. id. at 1324 ("If schools are to survive and prosper, school administrators must have
reasonable means at their disposal to deter conduct which substantially disrupts the school
environment.'). The logical extension of the Schaill court's amorphous rationale is the
conclusion that schools may test students voluntarily enrolling in extracurricular activities, to
ensure that leaders of extracurricular organizations do not serve as "leaders of the drug culture,"
but that they serve as positive role models for America's youth. Cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995) (noting athletes were deemed leaders of the drug culture instead
of positive role models).
88. See Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 760-61 (S.D.
Tex. 1989).
89. See id. at 760.
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significant number of students.' While the Schaill court observed
that students who wish to continue drug use may simply forego the
activity in question, the Brooks court decisively stated that the school
could not justify searching students and ignoring their reasonable
expectation of privacy based on students' ability to opt out of extracur-
ricular activities.' The Brooks court concluded that Schaills reason-
ing was unpersuasive92 and that the school system lacked a sufficiently
compelling interest to implement random, suspicionless urinalysis on
students who have no choice but to attend school.
9 3
The district court found very little evidence of a demonstrated
substance abuse problem within the school district."' Yet, the school
enacted the program in reaction to public opinion that a general drug
problem existed." Brooks thus differs from the facts of Schaill, where
the school implemented the testing program because of an existing
drug and alcohol problem.' However, the cases are similar because
students in both athletics and extracurricular activities were con-
sidered privileged to participate and to attain leadership roles in those
associated activities.9" Consequently, like athletes, it is necessary for
students who participate in extracurricular activities remain drug
free."
90. See id. at 763-65 (stating that it is the "eagle eye examination of personal information of
almost every child in the school district" that makes the search particularly intrusive).
91. Compare id. at 765 (noting that opting out of extracurricular activities to forgo drug
testing is not adequate justification to intrude upon the student's Fourth Amendment rights)
with Shaill, 864 F.2d at 1319 n.11 (acknowledging as a relevant factor in determining
reasonableness that students may simply choose to not participate in the school's athletic
program).
92. Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 765-66 (stating that "the law of the Seventh Circuit is different
from and less protective of student rights than Fifth Circuit law").
93. Id. at 766.
94. See id. at 761.
95. See id.
96. Compare Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1310 (7th Cir. 1988)
(demonstrated drug abuse within the TSC athletic program), with Brooks, 730 F. Supp. at 761
(commenting that little to no major drug or alcohol problems existed among the students).
97. See supra note 96. The school expressly noted the leadership roles student athletics and
extracurricular activities serve, providing positive examples to younger students through
sportsmanship and good conduct. See id. Further, the school remarked that it is a privilege to
participate in extracurricular activities. See id. As this Note argues and the school reinforced
here, as well as the Seventh Circuit in Schaill, it is not unreasonable for the school to require its
students receiving these privileges to be and remain drug-free.
98. See id; see also discussion supra note 97 and infra text at Part IV.
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B. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton-Providing a
Virtual Road Map
The 1995 decision in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, up-
holding a public school district's mandatory, suspicionless drug testing
of student athletes, is the touchstone of the Supreme Court's evolving
Fourth Amendment school drug testing jurisprudence. In step with
lower court decisions exploring the drug testing issue, the Court found
that'the public school's interest in maintaining a safe learning envi-
ronment decisively outweighed the individual's privacy rights."
In Acton, public school officials had noted widespread student
drug use," finding that student athletes were not only using drugs,
but were leading the school's "drug culture.""' Concerned about drug
use causing exacerbation of athletic injuries, the school board ap-
proved a policy subjecting athletic participants to random urinalysis
drug testing."2 Testing positive resulted in a conference with the
student's parents, and the student's option of either enrolling in a
drug assistance program or being suspended from participating in
athletics for the remainder of the season."3 Subsequent offenses re-
sulted in mandatory drug treatment, suspension from athletic events,
and even suspension from the current and next two athletic seasons."'
After signing up to play football, James Acton refused to take a
drug test,' 5 and the school subsequently denied him the ability to play
football.' Acton sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent
the school from enforcing its random urinalysis testing." Although
the District Court dismissed Acton's claim, the Ninth Circuit held that
99. Acton leaves open the question of whether it is constitutional to test students who
voluntarily enroll in extracurricular activities. At least one lower court has extended Acton to
reach this Note's conclusion-that public schools have the right to drug test extracurricular
students. See discussion infra Part III.
100. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1995) (observing that students'
expressed desire for drugs combined with sharp increases in disciplinary problems, rude
behavior during class, and outbursts of profane language, manifested an apparent increase in
drug use).
101. See id. at 649 ("Not only were student athletes included among drug users but, as the
District Court found, athletes were the leaders of the drug culture.').
102. See id. at 650.
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Vernonia's policy violated Acton's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 8
Clarifying its drug testing and school-search jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court confirmed that the touchstone of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in the public school context is "reasonableness."'' 8 Not-
ing that the "special needs" rationale applies in the school context, " '
justifying the abandonment of the warrant and probable-cause
requirements, the Court reiterated the importance of weighing the
school's interests against those of the individual student." '
The Court first addressed the student's privacy interest, seek-
ing to determine whether the public school student maintains rights
coextensive with the rights of adults outside the school's walls. The
Court concluded that the school's "custodial and tutelary control' over
students reduced the students' fundamental rights to be free in their
physical movement." Although acknowledging that students still "do
not shed their constitutional rights.., at the schoolhouse gate,""' the
Court reasoned that students' rights must yield to the school's interest
in ensuring a conducive learning environment."4
108. See id. at 652. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 513 U.S. 1013 (1994), to review
the question of whether the school district's random, suspicionless urinalysis drug testing
program violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
See Acton, 515 U.S. at 648-52.
109. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 652 (stating that "the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of
a governmental search is 'reasonableness' ").
110. See id. at 653. The Court stated that special needs arise when the warrant and
probable-cause requirements make impracticable law enforcements normal need to carry out its
duties. See id. (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
111. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 652-53. Further, the Court reviewed its rationale developed in
T.L.O., Skinner, and Von Raab, concluding that the balancing test of "reasonableness" was the
only Fourth Amendment inquiry necessary in determining whether a school's drug testing policy
violated the student's constitutional rights. See id. at 653-54 (noting that the Fourth
Amendment does not impose an "irreducible requirement" of first having individualized
suspicion in order to have probable cause for a search).
112. Id. at 654-55. The Court expressed that both historically and today, "unemancipated
minors lack some of the most fundamental rights of self-determination-including even the right
of liberty in its narrow sense, i.e., the right to come and go at will." Id. at 654. The Court further
explained that although the public school's role does not create a duty to protect the individual
student, the role does require the school to act "in loco parentis." See id. at 655 (quoting Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)). Consequently, the school must teach
"habits and manners of civility." Acton, 515 U.S. at 655 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681); see
also infra note 5 (explaining "in loco parentis").
113. Acton, 515 U.S. at 655-56 (citing the oft quoted language in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
114. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 656. After reviewing precedent where a student's rights in the
First and Fourteenth Amendment categories are not automatically co-extensive with adults, the
Court held that a student's Fourth Amendment rights are also "different in public schools than
elsewhere." See id. (reviewing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (advocating informal
due process rights of student); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (prohibiting use of vulgar and offensive
terms); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (allowing censorship of
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The public school student possesses a reduced expectation of
privacy, rendering the student's right to be free from searches and
seizures susceptible to a variety of government interests."' Moreover,
in light of the fact that athletic activities are not for the bashful,"6
with "communal undress" and lowered privacy in locker rooms, the
Court found that student-athletes' expectations of privacy are less
than those of ordinary students." Additionally, given the fact that the
student initially "volunteers"'8 to join the particular activity, sub-
jecting himself to the heightened rules and regulations of training
rules, dress code, insurance coverage, academic achievement, curfew,
and other related matters, the Court equated athletics to adults
choosing to work in a highly regulated industry."9  Students who
participate in athletic activities cannot expect as much privacy as
students who merely matriculate within the schoors academic
programs.'
In an effort to cabin drug testing programs, the Court stipu-
lated that drug testing programs be non-intrusive, 2' and that the
school demonstrate a compelling interest for implementing such a
school-sponsored publications); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (declining to
extend more additional safeguards upon corporal punishment)).
115. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 657 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985)).
116. See id. ("School sports are not for the bashful. They require 'suiting up' before each
practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards."). Drawing upon Schaill's rationale
of "communal undress" often present in athletics, the Court discussed the fact that student-
athletes often change and shower in non-private locker rooms, where showers and toilets afford
little to no privacy as well. See id.
117. See id. (quoting Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir.
1988)).
118. The Court emphasizes the significance of the individual student volunteering to engage
in a regulated activity. This volunteer aspect of high school athletics suggests that the student
impliedly agrees to a lower privacy interest and a higher level of conduct and behavior because of
perceived benefits gained through athletic participation. See id. ("By choosing to 'go out for the
team,' they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that
imposed on students generally.").
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. The Court analyzed the actual intrusiveness of the school's urinalysis program. See id.
at 658. Utilizing Skinner, the Court recognized that withdrawing urine from the individual
encroaches on a great privacy normally shielded by the Fourth Amendment. See id. Moreover,
the Court scrutinized the manner of production and the process at which the school obtained the
sample. See id. Nevertheless, the actual constitutionality of the urinalysis programs are beyond
this Note's scope. It is the author's argument that if the school carefully follows the criteria set
forth in Acton, using the Coures analysis to tailor one's drug testing program to the
constitutionally recognized testing principles, a school may withstand a Fourth Amendment
intrusiveness challenge concerning the actual method and process of obtaining the urine
samples. See id. at 658-60 (analyzing the drug testing process and ultimately finding that the
program's intrusiveness was not significant).
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program.' The Court drew upon the fact that schools have an inter-
est in preventing drug-abuse by students, and that if narrowly-
tailored only to student-athletes, a testing program is not significantly
intrusive.' The Court emphasized the negative "role moder' effect of
athletes using drugs, along with the health and safety risks when
drugs exacerbate athletic injuries, as support for the drug testing
program.'" Concluding that the students had a reduced expectation of
privacy, that the program was relatively unobtrusive,' and that the
school had a compelling interest in immediately curbing the drug-use
problem, the Court held that Vernonia's drug testing program with-
stands the Fourth Amendment's test of reasonableness.'
Although reserving the question of whether Acton may be ex-
tended to other contexts, 7 the Court noted that the significant reason
for upholding the constitutionality of Vernonia's program rested upon
the need to further the school's responsibilities as a guardian and
tutor of its students.' The Court did not limit its decision to ath-
letes,' leaving the door open for a logical extension of Acton's holding
to other school settings."u
122. See id. at 659-62.
123. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658-60, 662.
124. See id. at 662-63. The Court surveyed the harmful effects of drugs upon students and
their bodies. See id. at 661-62. Stating that "[s]chool years are the time when the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe," the Court reviewed literature
demonstrating drugs' deleterious effects on the drug-using student's nervous system and how
drugs inhibit successful lifelong learning and growth. Id. (citing Hawley, supra note 12; Estroff
et al., supra note 12; Kandel et al., supra note 12). Further, the Court recognized that drug-use
also affected the school's learning environment, inhibiting fellow students and teachers by
disrupting the educational process. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 662. The Court also analyzed the
constitutionality of suspicionless versus individual, suspicion-based testing programs, ultimately
concluding that a holding of constitutional reasonableness does not depend on finding a "least
restrictive alternative." See id. at 663. Rather, the Court found that suspicion-based testing may
be worse. See id. at 663. But see id. at 666-86 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (strongly criticizing the
Court's upholding of "suspicionless" testing within the school context).
125. See supra note 121 for discussion on the program's unobtrusiveness.
126. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
127. Id. at 665 ("We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will
readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts); see also id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (interpreting the Court's opinion as reserving judgment on the constitutionality of a
school's decision to impose mandatory drug tests on all students who are required to attend
school); id. at 685 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning the school's motive to apply the tests
only to student athletes as a tactic to pass constitutional scrutiny and noting that the original
program had called for testing all students involved in extracurricular activities).
128. Id. at 665. Because a school is entrusted with the custodial care of students, the Court
found the furtherance of the government's responsibilities as the most significant element in
allowing Vernonia's program to withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge.
129. It is important to note that the Court's minimal attempt to caution against extending its
holding to other contexts was made expressly by Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence, see id. at
666, and only in passing by the majority, see id. at 665. However, the Court never expressly
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The Court consequently provided a virtual road map for future
school districts and courts. A logical extension of Acton would allow
public schools to conduct drug testing programs in factually similar
situations."'
III. SEMINAL LOWER COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE WAKE OFACTON
A. Seventh Circuit Jurisprudence: A Repeating Pre-cursor?
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals-the same court that de-
cided Schaill more than ten years before-became the first court to
extend Acton and its progeny to uphold mandatory, suspicionless
urinalysis testing for students voluntarily participating in extracur-
ricular activities. Although controversial, the Seventh Circuit set
forth compelling and persuasive reasons for logically extending Acton's
conclusion.
In Todd v. Rush County Schools, the Seventh Circuit held that
random drug testing of students in extracurricular activities did not
violate the students' Fourth Amendment rights."' The school district's
program applied to all students enrolled in extracurricular activities."'
limited its decision to apply only to athletes, but rather left enough.room for a future, logical
extension to testing students involved in extracurricular activities as well.
130. Id. The Court only discussed the important element of furthering the school's
responsibilities as guardian of the children in its care, rather than even mentioning the program
pertaining only to athletes. See id.
131. See infra Part IV.
132. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 986-87 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit,
with all of the judges on the original panel, voted unanimously to deny rehearing en banc; a
majority of the active judges also voted to deny rehearing en banc. See Todd v. Rush County
Sch., 139 F.3d 571, 571 (7th Cir. 1998). But cf. id. at 573 (Ripple, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc) (arguing that the Supreme Court's holding in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305 (1997), requires the school district to define the tested group with particularity before
testing, so as to avoid the "sort of general search that, from the beginning of the Republic, had
been the principal concern of the Fourth Amendment"); see also id. (Wood, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc) (dissenting and wanting the court to clarify the Acton standard). It
is important to note that the Supreme Court recently denied plaintiffs petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.. See Todd v. Rush
County Sch., U.S. , 119 S. Ct. 68 (1998). Nevertheless, as the Court's denial only constitutes
a refusal to hear the case at that particular time, and it does not condone the particular circuit's
holding as the rule of law for the United States, this Note continues to assert that the Supreme
Court should adopt the Seventh Circuit's rationale in Todd as the necessary and logical
extension to the Court's holding in Acton.
133. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 984-85. The program enacted prohibited any high school student
from "participating in any extracurricular activities or driving to and from school unless the
student and parent or guardian consented to a test for drugs, alcohol or tobacco in random,
unannounced urinalysis examinations." Id. at 984. However, the court expressly declined to
discuss the constitutionality of upholding the driving to school prohibition, as plaintiffs all
2000] SCHOOL DRUG TESTING
Extracurricular activities not only included athletics, but encom-
passed all other school activities, such as Student Council, foreign
language clubs, Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Future Farmers of
America ('FFA"), and the Library Club.' Without consenting to
testing, a student could not participate in any extracurricular activ-
ity.'35 The school district informed the family of any student testing
positive, and the family had the opportunity to explain the test's
result." Failure to provide a satisfactory explanation of the positive
result prohibited the student from engaging in any extracurricular
activities until the student retested and obtained a negative result.""
Testing positive twice gave the school reasonable suspicion to test
further and then invoke disciplinary action."8
Plaintiffs included members of the Library Club, members of
the FFA, and a student who wished to videotape the football team, all
of whom refused to sign the drug testing program's consent forms."'
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the school from enforcing the program,
arguing that the school's imposition of random, mandatory suspicion-
wished to participate in extracurricular activities as well. Thus, the court limited its holding to
extracurricular activities. See id. at 985-86 n.1.
134. See id. at 984.
135. See id. at 984-85.
136. See id. at 985. Under the program, the school allowed the student and his family to
explain whether the student's inducement of certain medications produced the positive result
before any further disciplinary action occurred. See id.
137. See id. The program required no other disciplinary action for a positive result. See id.
The student is simply precluded from participating in extracurricular activities and from driving
to and from school in this case. See id. The school also provides the positive-testing student and
his or her parents with information on drug-treatment programs. See id. Further, the student
may always request a new urine test, so as to avoid possible testing aberrations. See id.
138. See id. Out of 950 students in the Rush County High School, 728 students consented to
the random urinalysis testing. See id. Out of that group, 170 students did not participate in
extracurricular activities or fall within the program's scope. See id.
Evidence indicated that the particular school arguably had a drug problem. See id. The
court indicated that from 1992-97, although there were no alcohol-related expulsions, "zero to
one tobacco-related expulsion[s] per year, and one to four drug-related expulsions" occurred. Id.
Concerning suspensions, 2-9 alcohol-related, 21-44 tobacco-related, and 1-9 drug-related
suspensions occurred. See id. Further, the Indiana Prevention Resource Center conducted a
survey of the school in 1994, finding that Rush County High School students in certain grades
used cigarettes and alcohol more than the state average, while marijuana usage in certain
grades was actually lower than the state average. See id. Also, "[t]wo wituesses stated that drug
use ha[d] been increasing at the high school, causing the drowning of a senior and an automobile
crash where the students were inhaling the contents of aerosol cans." Id. The testing program
did detect a small fraction of the students for abusing banned substances. See id. The program
detected five to eight students for either marijuana or for nicotine use. See id. The school tested
students on five to six occasions, involving twenty to thirty students each time. See id.
139. See id. Plaintiff William Todd wanted to videotape the football team, yet was barred by
the school from doing so when his parents refused to sign the consent form. See id. The school
barred the other plaintiffs from participating in the Library Club and FFA for their refusal to
sign the drug testing consent form.
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less urinalysis of all students wishing to participate in extracurricular
activities violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
140
Finding that Acton and Schaill controlled the question, the
Seventh Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's rationale that public
schools have a custodial and tutelary role vis-a-vis all students, in-
cluding those wishing to participate in extracurricular activities."'
1
Public school students thus have diminished constitutional rights in
the school context, and the school has a compelling need to deter drug
use; these facts liken the case to Acton. The primary difference be-
tween Todd and Acton was that the Acton testing program was limited
to students involved in athletics, while the Todd testing program
involved students in all extracurricular activities."' The Court found
that the same compelling interest applied whether the students were
athletes or whether the students were involved in all extracurricular
participation."4
Likening athletics to extracurricular activities, as if Acton were
a virtual road map, the Seventh Circuit used the Supreme Court's
factors in its equation: (1) that extracurricular activities are a valu-
able experience and a privilege like athletics, with associated prestige
enhancing benefits; (2) that the urinalysis program only serves as a
condition of participation in the extracurricular activity; (3) that the
school's program only applies to those students who voluntarily choose
to participate in the desired activities; (4) that students participating
in activities may take on leadership roles and serve as examples to
others; and (5) that the school has an interest in protecting the health
of the students."' Underlying the court's reasoning was the "special
need" to maintain a healthy learning environment, conducive to
studying."1' The court held that informal disciplinary methods and
procedures were necessary to further this mission of maintaining a
healthy learning environment.'
140. See id. at 985-87.
141. See id. at 986 & n.3 (after noting that the custodial and tutelary role schools maintain
over children was a central element in Acton, the Seventh Circuit found such a role logically
extended to the instant case as well).




146. See id. (citing Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1306, 1324 (7th Cir.
1988)) (noting that school survival depends on giving school administrators "reasonable means"
to deter disruptive conduct). Consequently, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Todd was
sufficiently like Acton and Schaill to withstand the plaintiffs Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment challenge. See id. at 987.
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Todd's holding serves as a legitimate reading of Acton; it logi-
cally extends Fourth Amendment reasonableness to testing students
who voluntarily participate in extracurricular activities."7 As the
Supreme Court found the Seventh Circuit's Schaill holding persuasive
when deciding Acton, this Note asserts the Court should use Todd as a
necessary extension of Acton in holding that testing of all students
voluntarily participating in extracurricular activities does not violate
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures."8
147. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571, 573 (7th Cir. 1998) (Ripple, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc) (recognizing that the court is interpreting Acton broadly, going a
long way toward permitting drug testing of the general school population).
148. The Seventh Circuit recently distinguished Willis I v. Anderson Community School
Corp., 158 F.3d 415, 424-25 (7th Cir. 1998), where it struck down a school's requirement for
mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of truant students or students breaking school rules. See
id. at 425. Finding that the school could have easily maintained a suspicion-based testing
program, the court found that the privacy interests present in Willis H were greater than those
present in Acton or Todd. See id. at 420-22. In doing so, however, the court recognized Todd as
the logical extension of Acton. See id. at 423. The Willis H court focused on the need to set some
boundaries within the school-context, so as to not sanction unbridled blanket-testing of the entire
student population. See id. at 425. See generally The Fourth Amendment: School Drug Tests
Testing the Courts, AB.A. J., Dec. 1998, at 33 (remarking that students who wish not to be drug
tested in public schools are "better off being belligerent than involved," when reviewing the
differences between Willis Hand Todd).
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided, but later
vacated for mootuess, Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999), involving a public school's
random drug testing of students in seventh through twelfth grades. See id. at 576. Although
vacated because the student graduated high school before the court could rule, the opinion
provides helpful support to this Note's conclusion.
The school banned the student who refused to submit to such testing from participating in
the extracurricular activities of the radio club, prom committee, the quiz bowl, and school dances,
among others. See id. at 577. Relying on Acton's assertion that "special needs" exist within the
school environment to justify such testing, the Eighth Circuit held that all students within the
public school experience a diminished expectation of privacy, not merely student-athletes. See
id. at 579. Expressly noting that the school's testing "policy goes beyond student athletes to
include all manner of extracurricular activities," the court found that extracurricular activities
may possess features that further lower the student's expectation of privacy, like that of
athletics. Id. at 579.
Importantly, the court recognized no immediate drug and alcohol problem among the
students, as was present in Acton. See id. at 580. Yet, the court did find that drugs and alcohol
pose enough significant damage and disruption to the school that the school should not have to
wait for a demonstrable problem to arise before testing. See id. at 581. As such, the Eighth
Circuit reinforces this Note's proposition that prevention through a constitutional suspicionless
drug testing of all students voluntarily enrolling in extracurricular activities is necessary to
preserve the school's learning environment. Cf. id. at 582 (stating that "when the mission of the
public schools can be so thoroughly thwarted by substance abuse among the pupils, a random
search policy such as the one at issue here, which is designed to effectively deter students who
may be disposed to such abuse is reasonable and therefore constitutional").
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B. The Supreme Court of Colorado-Constitutional
Rejection or Extension?
While Todd signaled that public schools may test students
wishing to participate in extracurricular activities, Trinidad School
District No. 1 v. Lopez confused the issue. Lopez distinguished band
members from athletes, and held that the school's suspicionless drug
testing program for students participating in extracurricular activities
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1"9
The Colorado Supreme Court thus chose not to extend Acton. This
confusion should be a signal to the Supreme Court that the public's
concern over drug testing within the school system remains undecided
and tumultuous.
Enacting a mandatory, suspicionless urinalysis program of all
sixth through twelfth grade students voluntarily participating in
extracurricular activities, the Trinidad School District required each
student to successfully pass a drug test before enrolling in extracur-
ricular activities." If the student tested positive, the laboratory
automatically performed a subsequent test to verify the first results."'
If the subsequent test was also positive, the school notified the stu-
dent's parents or guardians; the principal then conducted a due proc-
ess inquiry with the student and his or her parent or guardian as to
the violation, and the school required that the student submit to a
drug assistance program and weekly drug tests for six weeks."' A
student's refusal resulted in suspension from current and future
extracurricular activities." Second and third offenses resulted in
longer suspensions."
149. Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1110 (Colo. 1998).
150. See id. at 1098. The Policy, entitled "Drug Testing Student Athletes/Cheerleaders/Extra
Curricular," also allowed school officials to test students who participate in an extracurricular
activity and were under reasonable suspicion of drug use. See id. The Colorado Supreme Court
expressly limited its holding to students involved in the marching band. See id. at 1098 n.6. The
court declined to comment on the Policy's application to other student activities. See id.
Moreover, the court noted that the program had only been applied to students wanting to
participate in volleyball, football, golf, cheerleading, and the marching band. See id. at 1099.
The policy resulted in one-third of all high school students and one-fourth of all junior high
school students being tested for illegal drug use. See id.
151. See id. at 1098.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. The second offense resulted in suspension from participating in current and
subsequent extracurricular activities, and mandatory drug-assistance programs. See id. A third
offense invoked suspension from the current and next two extracurricular activity seasons. See
id.
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Although the school demonstrated an ever-increasing drug
problem,'" no evidence suggested illicit drug-use by band members."
Carlos Lopez enrolled in two band classes, in which he received aca-
demic credit and grades, and also enrolled'5 in the marching band."u
Yet, when confronted with the drug testing program, he refused to
consent, seeking to enjoin the school from enforcing the program.159
In reviewing the school's drug testing program, the Supreme
Court of Colorado noted that the policy encompassed more than volun-
tary activities. The program reached even those students who en-
rolled in some of the academic band classes by virtue of the classes'
requirements of participation in the "extracurricular" marching
band."® Analyzing the Supreme Court's "special needs" rationale in
Acton, the Colorado court decided not to extend Acton, noting two
issues of distinguishment. First, the court found that the marching
band hardly fit within the rationale that students participating in the
activity have ceded some measure of privacy by enrolling in the activ-
ity, which the Supreme Court had found persuasive in diminishing
155. See id. at 1098-99. An independent research firm, the Search Institute of Minneapolis,
Minnesota, conducted an attitudinal and behavioral survey on the schoors students, finding that
44% of students in grades six through twelve had used drugs in the last year. See id. at 1098. Of
the sixth-grade students, 23% used drugs in the last year, and an alarming 63% used drugs in
the eleventh grade. See id. Further, 63% of the schoors seniors had at least used marijuana
once during their lives, while 13% reported using cocaine at least once. See id. Also, 20% of the
eighth graders frequently used drugs. See id. Drug-use at the school exceeded national averages
by a significant margin. See id. (noting that only 35% senior marijuana use and 6% cocaine use
compared to Trinidad's 63% and 13% usage, respectively).
156. Although the trial court did not find any distinguishing use between that of athletes and
those students participating in other extracurricular activities, the band director testified he had
not observed increased drug use among the band members in the three years before the drug
testing policy was adopted. See id. at 1099.
157. The court expressly remarked that the school's policy required participation in the
extracurricular marching band, if the student matriculated in either band classes. See id. at
1105. Therefore, participation in "extracurricular" marching band was necessary for academic
band credit. See id. Consequently, the court commented that "two for-credit classes that are
part of the regular curriculum of course offerings are inextricably linked to the 'extracurricular'
activity of marching band." Id. Failure to participate in the marching band resulted in failing
one or both of the for-credit classes. See id.
158. See id. at 1097, 1100.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1105, stating:
while a cursory reading of the Policy indicates that it reaches only those students who are
participating in voluntary extracurricular activities, the real scope of the Policy is not so
limited. Under the Policy, students who are enrolled in a regular class must provide a
urine sample for drug testing.
See also supra note 157 (discussing the inextricable linkage between the extracurricular activity
of marching band and the for-credit band classes).
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student-athletes' expectation of privacy in Acton.'61 Second, the Lopez
court noted a significant difference between the cases in that partici-
pating in the marching band was not truly voluntary, as the students
were required to participate as a class requirement.162 Because of
these two differences, the court recognized that students do share a
diminished expectation of privacy compared to adults, but that the
marching band members at issue here possessed a much higher de-
gree of privacy than did the athletes of Acton."
Unlike Acton, the school's testing program in Lopez pertained
to students who did not have a demonstrable drug problem."M The
court expressly declined to subject marching' band students to drug
testing simply because they were enrolled in an activity, which carries
with it intrinsic benefits and prestige of being a "role-model" to other
students.1' Instead, the court remarked that if students wished to
pursue post-secondary education and have a meaningful high school
education, then participation in extracurricular activities was a neces-
sity.'" This observation changed the analysis by introducing the pos-
sibility that drug testing programs may constructively deprive stu-
dents of academic and personal development. 67 Basing its decision on
the lack of voluntariness, communal undressing, and an identifiable
drug-abusing group, the Colorado Supreme Court struck down Trini-
dad's testing program as unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.1"
161. See Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1107 (observing that the "communal undress" element present in
Acton was lacking here; although band members wear uniforms, they do not publicly undress or
shower together).
162. Id. (recognizing that the Court's voluntariness factor was not met in Acton).
163. See id. But see id. at 1111 (Scott, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no
constitutionally significant distinction concerning a student voluntarily enrolling in an
extracurricular activity and that of an activity awarding an associated academic credit for
participation; and, that there really is no difference in communal undress in band activities than
the undress in sporting activities present in Acton); see also id. at 1117 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S.
at 653) ("I believe the privacy right announced in the majority opinion must yield to the 'special
needs' that 'exist in the public school context,' as acknowledged by the United States Supreme
Court.").
164. Id. at 1109 (noting the differences between the band members disciplinary records, and
the lack of risk of physical harm compared to athletes).
165. See id.
166. See id. at 1109-10 (citing Todd v. Rush County Sch., 139 F.3d 571, 571-73 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that "involvement in a school's
extracurricular offerings is a vital adjunct to the educational experience")).
167. See id. (declining to extend the traditional rationale of the school's need to deter drug
use rationale to justify testing the marching band members).




A tension exists between the decisions of the Seventh Circuit
and the Colorado Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit's holding
remains a viable opinion, allowing for schools across the United States
to maintain a conducive learning environment by enacting drug test-
ing programs to deter drug-abuse. 9 Although the Colorado Supreme
Court expressly struck down the drug testing program in Lopez, this
Note suggests that the court's holding does not broadly reject drug
testing for extracurricular activities; rather, it is distinguishable be-
cause it presents facts that may not exist in many situations.
IV. EXTENDING ACTON TO ALL EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
The logical extension of the Supreme Court's holding in Acton
is the conclusion that a school may test all students participating in
extracurricular activities, upholding the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Todd. Students voluntarily participating in extracurricular activities
possess attributes similar to athletes in that they voluntarily partici-
pate, receive an intrinsic benefit of enhanced prestige, and serve as
examples to other students. The health and safety of students are
concerns in extracurricular activities just as in athletics. Granted,
this Note's assertion raises moral and legal considerations, especially
when one considers the private nature of urination and the extent to
which testing programs invade the lives of public school students.
Nevertheless, if society demands that the American public school
further its necessary and vital mission of educating students for to-
morrow, then the Supreme Court needs to validate Todd's extension of
Acton-to allow for the mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of stu-
dents voluntarily participating in extracurricular activities.
A. American School Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence:
The Precedent is Set
The Fourth Amendment mandates that federal actors not sub-
ject individuals to unreasonable searches and seizures, allowing them
169. It is important to note that other schools systems are exploring the mandatory drug
testing of students involved in extracurricular activities. For example, the New Jersey Schools
adopted a drug testing program of all students. See John Gibeaut, Seeking Substances, Indiana
Schools Push for Expansion of Drug Test Ruling, 84 A.B.A. J. 42 (1998). Nevertheless, other
schools like the Miami-Dade County School District and schools in New Orleans have declined
adopting such programs. See id. However, with Todd's ruling, the Seventh Circuit may have
signaled to schools that they need not be as hesitant in the future. See id. (arguing that the
Seventh Circuit's cases may encourage public schools to enact mandatory, suspicionless drug
testing programs for students voluntarily participating in extracurricular activities).
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to maintain their bodily, personal, and professional integrity."' By
incorporation, the Fourteenth Amendment extends the Fourth
Amendment's edict to guarantee the same rights against state
actors." ' State actors include public school officials.' When the pub-
lic school requires the mandatory collection of urine or other body
specimens in drug testing programs, the Supreme Court has consis-
tently held that the programs constitute searches within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment."3 Thus, a public school's drug testing
program must comply with Fourth Amendment protections.
Usually, the Court requires an in-depth inquiry into the exis-
tence of probable cause and the issuance of a warrant to fulfill the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment."' The Supreme Court, how-
ever, recognizes a "special needs" exception, allowing the abandon-
ment of the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable cause
requirements, in some situations. 5  The Court has held that this
"special needs" rationale exists not only in the law enforcement con-
text,"6 but also in the public school context. 7 The Court has aban-
doned the probable cause and warrant requirements within the school
context, invoking the "special needs" exception when swift and infor-
mal disciplinary methods are necessary to maintain a conducive
learning environment for students. 8 A pronounced drug problem in a
170. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (precluding the federal government from violating "[tihe
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.").
171. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
172. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985) (explaining that "school officials
act as representatives of the state" when performing searches or disciplining students).
173. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (applying a Fourth
Amendment analysis to a drug testing program for student athletes); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (agreeing with unanimous conclusions of the Federal
Courts of Appeals that collecting and testing urine are searches governed by the protections of
the Fourth Amendment); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665
(1989) (applying a Fourth Amendment analysis to a drug testing program of the United States
Customs Service).
174. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 586 (1980).
175. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 653; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
176. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873 ("[W]e have permitted exceptions when 'special needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable.' ").
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public school will usually justify extending the "special needs" ration-
ale to allow for a suspicionless drug testing regime.7
Furthermore, a school performs a custodial and tutelary role,
allowing it to wield substantially more control over students than the
government may use with respect to free adults." As part of that role,
the school closely supervises students and enforces rules to maintain a
proper learning environment. 8' Consequently, the school inculcates
manners of civility into its students, a central rationale that the Court
has used in upholding drug testing programs.' In fulfilling its role,
the public school exercises a significant degree of control over the
freedom of the individual student. Students lack some of the basic
rights of freedom that adults enjoy outside the school context." The
school's restriction on students' freedom is thus a legitimate and ap-
propriate function of the school."M
The Court has recognized that students have a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy in the school setting."u With long hours in close
association with each other and their teachers, routine physical and
medical examinations, and repeated vaccinations for various diseases,
public school students' privacy rights are reduced in the interest of
promoting a safe environment conducive to learning and free from
disruptive behavior."M
179. See Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 373-74 (6th
Cir. 1998). Although Knox asserts the rationale to apply to testing employees, the Sixth Circuit
reviewed Skinner and Acton to justify its conclusion that when a dsmonstrated drug problem
exists it will usually favor invoking the "special needs" rationale necessary to uphold a
suspicionless testing program. See id. ("[Tihe existence of a pronounced drug problem within the
group of employees targeted for testing typically tips the equities in favor of upholding
suspicionless testing."); see also Solid Waste Dep't Mechanics v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d
1068, 1073 (10th Cir. 1998) (reviewing Skinner, Von Raab, and Acton, asserting that a testing
program's validity depends on the adoption of a documented drug abuse problem); see generally
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 306 (1997) ("A demonstrated problem of drug abuse, while not
in all cases necessary to the validity of a testing regime, would shore up an assertion of special
need for a suspicionless general search program.") (internal citation omitted).
180. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 655.
181. See id.
182. See id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (noting that
schools have the "power and indeed the duty to 'inculcate the habits and manners of civility' into
its students")). The Court further observed that "[t]he most significant element in this case is
the first we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its
care." Id. at 665.
183. See id. at 654.
184. See id. at 654-56.
185. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); see also
Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 n.2; Willis H1 v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415, 421 (7th
Cir. 1998).
186. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 656-58.
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Although urinating, a function reserved and performed usually
by oneself and not upon demand by any person or entity, is tradition-
ally shielded by the utmost right to privacy,'87 the Court has recog-
nized that in some instances government may regulate this traditional
function." Because of the significance of this intrusion, the school
may only invade the privacy of urination upon proof of a compelling
need in light of the surrounding circumstances.1" Courts must engage
in the Fourth Amendment's balancing test of "reasonableness,"
weighing the public school's interest in maintaining a healthy learning
environment against the privacy rights of the individual student.'
B. The Logical Extension of Acton to Extracurricular Activities
Mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of students voluntarily
participating in extracurricular activities"' passes the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" test because: (1) stu-
dents voluntarily enroll in extracurricular activities; (2) the student's
participation is not only a privilege, but carries with it enhanced pres-
187. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (quoting
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that
the passing of urine is "traditionally performed without public observation"); see also id. at 646-
47 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (remarking that urine collection is far from a "minimal" intrusion
upon the individual); Acton, 515 U.S. at 658; Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095,
1108 (Colo. 1998) ("Ordinarily, a student urinates simply because the body requires it, not
because a school district insists that the student provide a urine sample on demand in order for
the school district to search it for the presence of drugs."); Fried, supra note 52, at 487
(explaining that "in our culture the excretory fumctions are shielded by more or less absolute
privacy, so much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as extremely
distressing, as detracting from one's dignity and self esteem.").
188. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 661 (finding that the nature of deterring drug use by
schoolchildren is undoubtedly compelling); see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670 (compelling
governmental interest in making sure Customs officials seeking promotions to positions
interdicting drugs or handling firearms were drug-free); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628 (compelling
governmental interest in preventing future railway accidents).
189. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 661.
190. See id. at 652-53, 665 (noting that when the government acts as a custodian, the
relevant analysis centers around determining whether a reasonable tutor or guardian would
undertake such an action, in determining if a drug testing program will pass constitutional
scrutiny).
191. For purposes of this Note, extracurricular activities are considered those activities
students voluntarily participate in without receiving academic credit. Cf. Lopez, 963 P.2d at
1115 n.4 (Scott, J., dissenting) (noting that extracurricular activities are defined by the student
not receiving academic credit, like drama performances; whereas, band is considered "co-
curricular" because the student receives academic credit and grades for participation). Partial-
credit activities (i.e. "co-curricular activities" as referred to in Lopez) invoke additional
considerations of voluntariness. See id. at 1107 (finding that the Supreme Court's notion of
voluntariness expressed in Acton did not apply to the present case because students who took
for-credit music classes were required to participate in the marching band, thus, being subjected
to mandatory testing as part of the school's curriculum instead).
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tige, benefits, and possible leadership roles, where the student serves
as an example to other students; and (3) given its prophylactic and
non-punitive purposes, mandatory testing does not bar the student
from participating, but only serves as a condition to the student's
participation in the desired activity. For the reasons set forth below,
Acton's extension is not only logical, but necessary.9 '
First, mandatory, suspicionless drug testing only applies to
students who voluntarily participate in extracurricular activities.'
When students exercise their own volition by enrolling in extracur-
ricular activities, the student agrees to be a part of an organization,""
and to abide by the organization's guidelines and rules of conduct.'95 A
student participating in extracurricular activities expressly or im-
pliedly agrees to subscribe to a heightened level of rules, conduct, and
regulations not associated with everyday matriculation." Depending
on the activity, the student may have to submit to physical exams,
obtain insurance or valid insurance waivers, follow a dress code and
abide by other requirements.'" While not all extracurricular activities
192. But see Acton, 515 U.S. at 665 ("We caution against the assumption that suspicionless
drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts."). Cf. id. at 666 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring) (expressly reserving such a question of extending drug testing to students
voluntarily enrolling in extracurricular activities).
193. Cf. Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 985, 986 n.1 (7th Cir. 1998) (limiting its
analysis to upholding drug testing consistent with the Fourth Amendment as to students
wishing to or voluntarily participating in extracurricular activities).
194. Cf. Acton, 515 U.S. at 657 (stating that student-athletes have a reduced expectation of
privacy because "[b]y choosing to 'go out for the team,' they voluntarily subject themselves to a
degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally').
195. See id. (remarking that students who voluntarily participate subject themselves to
additional rules and regulations not normally associated with a student attending school).
196. See id.
197. Cf. id. (observing that student-athletes must submit to a preseason physical, acquire
adequate insurance coverage or sign an insurance waiver, and additionally comply with "rules of
conduct, dress, training hours and related matters as may be established for each sport by the
head coach and athletic director with the principal's approvar). Students engaged in
extracurricular participation often must obtain a physical exam (e.g. cheerleading), obtain
adequate insurance or sign insurance waivers (e.g. any extracurricular activity that extends the
school's liability beyond that normally associated within the school-context, much like field trips,
outings, events, conferences, and competitions that many extracurricular students participate in
as part of their established activities), and subscribe to additional requirements, such as when
the extracurricular activity has a particular required attire (e.g. FFA), training rules (e.g. Drama
Club, by mandating hours of practice and rehearsal), or other general regulations tailored to the
organization's specific needs. Cf. id. Granted, extracurricular participation will not have the
same elements of "communal undressing" and locker room debuts as that present in Acton, but
many extracurricular activities possess elements of shared exposure to other student
participants when performing specified activities, much like when one changes behind scenes for
a drama production, the donning of an organization's uniforms, or the general need to change
into a different required attire for a particular event. Cf. id. Consequently, in many contexts,
extracurricular participation can be equated to the same volition the student must take to
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are considered "not for the bashful, 19 by virtue of participation in
most extracurricular activities, the student agrees to comply with
some heightened level of regulation."' Voluntary undertaking of an
extracurricular activity is a student's affirmative choice to abide by a
particular activity's additional rules and regulations,' which ensure
that participants are drug-free.
Second, a student's participation in extracurricular activities is
not only a privilege, but carries enhanced prestige and intrinsic bene-
fits." By virtue of their participation in extracurricular activities,
students gain skills and experience, acquiring more skills than the
student who participates in no extracurricular activities." Extra-
curricular students can and do serve as positive examples to other
students and serve as representatives of the school to the surrounding
community." Enhanced prestige, intrinsic benefits, and leadership
roles equate to the tangible and intangible advancements acquired
through athletic participation. "It is not unreasonable to couple these
benefits with an obligation to undergo drug testing."'
participate in an extracurricular activity, subjecting the student to the particular organization's
or activity's heightened regulations.
198. See Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1107 (Colo. 1998) (referring to
participation in the marching band).
199. See supra note 197.
200. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that "it is
appropriate to include students who participate in extracurricular activities in the drug testing").
Cf. generally Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1107 (finding that because the marching band's participation
was mandated through enrollment in a for-credit music class, the absence of voluntariness was
one of the principle reasons to strike the drug testing program down as unconstitutional).
201. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
202. See id.
203. See id. (observing that "extracurricular activities 'are considered valuable to the school
experience, and [that] participation may assist a student in getting into college,'...
extracurricular activities, like athletics, 'are a privilege at the High School"' and remarking that
students participating in extracurricular activities, like athletes, "can take leadership roles in
the school community and serve as an example to others"). But see Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1109 ("In
our view, simply being a role model by virtue of participation in an extracurricular activity is
insufficient to support a conclusion that the school's mandated drug testing program [is]
reasonable.").
204. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (citing Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d
1309, 1320 (7th Cir. 1988), which recognized the appropriateness of including students
voluntarily participating in extracurricular activities in a public school's drug testing program).
But see Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319 ('Random testing of athletes does not necessarily imply random
testing of band members or the chess team."); Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (striking down mandatory, suspicionless urinalysis of
students participating in extracurricular activities). However, the Seventh Circuit decided both
Todd and Schaill, subsequently upholding such testing in Todd. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986-87
("We conclude that Rush County Schools' drug testing program is sufficiently similar to the
programs in Vernonia and Schaill to pass muster under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.").
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Finally, drug testing programs only serve prophylactic and
non-punitive purposes.' Drug testing programs do not criminalize
the individual student's behavior, but only protect students from
injury and health risks associated with drug abuse.' Mandatory
testing programs do not punish the individual student; rather, they
serve only as a condition to the student's participation in the desired
activity.' If the student wishes to partake in the activity, then the
school should be able to ensure that the student is not under the influ-
ence of drugs while participating.' If the student desires to use
drugs, the student may choose not to participate in extracurricular
activities. ' The student thus strikes a "bargain" with the public
school, choosing to be drug-free for the privilege of participating in
extracurricular activities.Y Because drug testing programs only serve
non-punitive and prophylactic purposes, testing students who volun-
tarily participate in extracurricular activities is a reasonable and
constitutional search.1
C. Deterring Drug Use: A Cure for the Disease
When drugs invade our school systems, threatening the safety
of students and the tranquility of the learning environment, the
205. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 n.2 (1995) (noting that the
search was "undertaken for prophylactic and distinctly nonpunitive purposes (protecting student
athletes from injury, and deterring drug use in the student population)").
206. See id.
207. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (holding that the students' requirement to submit to random
drug testing only serves as a condition of participation in the extracurricular activity); see also
Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319.
208. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (commenting that it is reasonable for a school to combine
drug testing with a student's participation in extracurricular activities because the student gains
benefits from the activity); see also Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320.
209. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 657 (holding that it is the student's voluntariness that provides
reason for students to expect certain intrusions upon their individual privacy, not normally
associated with matriculation).
210. See Willis II v. Anderson Community Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 1998)
(interpreting Acton and Todds drug testing programs as negotiating a bargain with the student
in return for the student's privilege to participate in his or her desired extracurricular activity).
211. Nevertheless, many writers criticize the Seventh Circuit's holding in Todd, arguing that
it did not heed the Supreme Court's advice in Acton, nor did it adequately apply the
reasonableness test because an adequate correlation does not exist between those students being
tested and an established drug problem. See, e.g., Gibeaut, supra note 169, at 43-44 (arguing
that the Seventh Circuit "glossed over the starting point for any Fourth Amendment analysis,"
and that it did not heed Justice Scalia's admonition in Acton where Scalia wrote: "We caution
against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in
other contexts.'); see also Recent Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716-18 (1999) (arguing that the
Seventh Circuit failed to consider any correlation between an established drug problem and the
students being tested, ignoring well-established precedent in applying such an element of the
"reasonableness" test).
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school's interest outweighs that of the individual." 1 The school years
serve as a critical impasse during a student's life. While attending
school, the child faces a barrage of learning, whether in the social,
physical, emotional, or academic realms. Yet, when drugs infect the
school system, the learning process is crippled. Drugs' physical and
psychological effects cause lifelong and profound losses. 1' Statistics
demonstrate that drug use decreases the chances that a student will
graduate high school.214 Drug use creates danger in the classrooms
when students use tools, machines, scalpels, and chemicals.15 These
deleterious consequences legitimize a school's interest in drug pre-
vention.
Yet drugs not only affect the child, but they also taint the en-
tire school system by disrupting the educational process. 6 The
Supreme Court has recognized a school's duty to maintain an ade-
quate learning environment, a component of which is restrained from
abusing drugs. 7 Schools must be allowed to use all reasonable means
212. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (noting the school has a legitimate
interest in providing an adequate learning environment for the student). But see id. at 361-62
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Fourth Amendment
"rests on the principle that a true balance between the individual and society depends on the
recognition of 'the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men' "). Cf Willis II, 158 F.3d at 425 (commenting that it is still "necessary to
establish some boundaries so as not to sanction 'routine drug testing... on all students required
to attend school,"' in striking down a school's drug testing of students suspended for fighting, as
not justified by "special needs').
213. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 661.
214. See TETSUJI YAMADA ET AL., THE IMPACT OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION AND MARIJUANA
USE ON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION, 13 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, Working Paper
No. W4497 (1993); see also Anthony G. Buzbee, Note, Who Will Speak for the Teachers?
Precedent Prevails in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1229, 1231-33
(1996) (arguing that in light of Acton, drug testing of not only extracurricular students but all
students is allowed).
215. See Buzbee, supra note 214, at 1259-61 (noting that students using tools and dangerous
substances in classes like biology and chemistry, along with participating in physical education
classes and certain extracurricular activities like JROTC, serve as severe risks while under
drugs' influence). See generally id. at 1259-60 nn. 280-81 & 285 (reviewing various possible
accidents that may occur within the school system).
216. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 662 (stating that "the effects of a drug-infested school are visited
not just upon the user, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process
is disrupted').
217. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.9 ("The maintenance of discipline in the schools requires
not only that students be restrained from assaulting one another, abusing drugs and alcohol, and
committing other crimes, but also that students conform themselves to the standards of conduct
prescribed by school authorities.'); see also Acton, 515 U.S. at 661 ('Deterring drug abuse by our
Nation's schoolchildren is at least as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the
Nation's laws against the importation of drugs.. . ."); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp.,
864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that a conducive learning environment must be
maintained if the individual student is to learn at all).
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to combat drug abuse if education is to be successful."8 No one doubts
the problem exists. Courts need to recognize that a cure exists. A
school's mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of students voluntarily
participating in extracurricular activities serves as the elixir to the
problem.
V. CONCLUSION
Mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of students voluntarily
participating in extracurricular activities meets the Court's Fourth
Amendment "reasonableness" test. Since 1985, the Court has consis-
tently recognized that students possess diminished privacy interests
in the school setting. Abandoning the Fourth Amendment's warrant
and probable cause requirements, the Court has adopted a "special
needs" rationale to justify using only a "reasonableness" test when
determining whether a search by school officials violates the student's
Fourth Amendment rights.
As society recognizes the need to curb the drug problem in
America, the Court has extended the "special needs" rationale to drug
testing programs. Mandatory, suspicionless drug testing programs
may be constitutional if the school's interest is strong enough to over-
ride the student's individual privacy interests.
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton attempted to resolve the
issue of whether a school's interest in preventing athletes and stu-
dents from using drugs outweighed the privacy interest of the individ-
ual students."9 The Court upheld the school's drug testing program,
focusing on the need of schools to conduct testing in light of demon-
strated drug abuse problems in the school."2 Although the Supreme
Court reserved the question of whether drug testing programs may be
extended to other contexts, such as to all students involved in extra-
curricular activities, the Seventh Circuit logically made this exten-
sion."l The Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Todd v. Rush County
218. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324 (If the schools are to survive and prosper, school
administrators must have reasonable means at their disposal to deter conduct which
substantially disrupts the school environment."); see also Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d
984, 986 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Schaill for the same proposition); John J. Bursch, Note, The 4 R's
of Drug Testing in Public Schools: Random Is Reasonable and Rights Are Reduced, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 1221, 1254 (1996) (arguing that random, school-wide drug testing "does not signal the
'death' of student constitutional rights but rather a narrow exception intended to give school
officials a stronger weapon in the war against drugs").
219. Acton, 515 U.S. at 648.
220. See id. at 664-66.
221. See discussion supra Part HLI.A_
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Schools sets forth persuasive reasons to allow the testing of students
who voluntarily join extracurricular activities.'
This Note demonstrates that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
allows mandatory suspicionless drug testing of extracurricular stu-
dents for three primary reasons. First, students voluntarily choose to
participate in extracurricular activities, an affirmative choice by the
individual student. A student decides whether the school should find
out about illicit drug use; the choice being non-participation versus
participation after undergoing drug treatment. Second, the student
receives enhanced prestige, intrinsic benefits, and the privilege of
participating in activities, where the student may serve as a role
model to other students in the community. These benefits come with a
small price, that those who receive and enjoy them are not under the
influence of illicit drugs. Third, appropriate drug testing programs
only have non-punitive and prophylactic purposes, seeking only to
protect the student as well as other students. The programs do not
jail a student who tests positive.
As drugs infect our school system, schools need a reasonable
means to combat the disease. The Fourth Amendment requires bal-
ancing the student's individual privacy interests against the school's
need to maintain a learning environment. Drugs have profound and
lifelong effects on students' maturing minds and bodies. Drug use
disrupts not only students and faculty, but the entire learning process.
No one doubts that a drug problem exists, and that it will continue.
With the precedent set, and the extension logical, mandatory suspi-
cionless drug testing of students voluntarily participating in extracur-
ricular activities is the constitutional cure.
James M. McCray"
222. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986-87.
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